Alfred Schutz: Philosopher and Social Scientist *

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Abstract. Aron Gurwitsch's critique of Schutz's essay "The Stranger" is the starting point for this consideration of Schutz's relationship with phenomenology. This relationship is based on Schutz's emphasis on the value of the "average" as a phenomenological structure. In opposing sociology to philosophy, Gurwitsch takes this value as inferior in comparison with what he sees as cardinal issues of transcendental phenomenology. What Gurwitsch finds incompatible with phenomenological inquiry -- the idea and practice of the natural attitude within the social sphere -- Schutz turns into the core of his philosophy. "The phenomenology of the natural attitude" is as essentially philosophical as any reflectively practiced human science. The problem of how everydayness is constituted requires a phenomenological insight that leads the explorer -- through reconstructing the meaning in terms of the mundane -- straight to the origin.

The reader of Philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939–1959 can hardly overlook or ignore the temporary break between the two men which is occasioned by Schutz's essay on "The Stranger," published in 1944. The break is temporary but bitter. The previous salutations in the correspondence -- Dear Friend Schutz and Dear Friend Gurwitsch -- give way abruptly in Schutz's letter of June 11, 1945, which begins: "Dear Mr. Gurwitsch." Moreover, it must be noted that almost a year has passed since Gurwitsch's letter of July 16, 1944 -- a rather substantial document, one deeply critical of Schutz's "The Stranger." The Editor provides a footnote, stating: "The gap of almost a full year in the correspondence and Schutz's formal salutation indicate some kind of interruption in the friendship." I am reminded of an old cartoon, showing the city of Dresden reduced to rubble. An onlooker asks his neighbor, "What happened?" "Rats," is the reply.

What was Gurwitsch's objection to Schutz's essay? Gurwitsch writes:

* Editor's note: Presented as the Alfred Schutz Memorial Lecture at the meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences in October 1995, in Chicago, Illinois. The lecture was co-sponsored by SPHS, the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, and the American Philosophical Association. We regret to inform our readers that Maurice Natanson died in August 1996. He was noted not only for his many contributions to Schutz scholarship but also as an eminent philosopher who enriched our research in philosophy of the human sciences. He will be greatly missed.
From the point of view of formal sociology there is nothing to say against it. But it is precisely this point of view that is questionable; and just your essay makes this questionableness visible. Understand me: it goes without saying that I recognize the legitimacy and the necessity of this sort concerning the structures of everydayness. I know that for certain theoretical reasons such investigations must be pursued in still greater scope than has been the case up to now. But the question is: How far does the field of formal sociology reach, which phenomena are accessible to its methods and concepts, and which are no longer accessible (1989, pp. 69–70)?

This is the surface complaint. What lies below it may perhaps be summarized in a question: What is a philosopher, indeed, a phenomenologist of Schutz’s genius doing in the company of wanderers in the natural attitude, humming, as it were, while Homer roared? And Gurwitsch is relentless in pressing his charge. He writes:

We don’t want to forget, dear friend, that our genealogy as philosophers goes back to a fool and a martyr. Back to the martyr Socrates, who, as I learned, made a nuisance of himself because he continually contradicted everyone and asked questions about things which public opinion had long since dealt with, and was in addition very successful. But concerning the fool Thales they tell the story that, absorbed in deep reflection, he fell into a manure pit and was jeered at by a milkmaid, since he knew his way around with the stars but was incapable of finding his way on the street (1989, p. 71).

Finally, is not the “Crisis” which Husserl raged against in the name of Reason and the nobility of Consciousness, is not Husserl’s warning to all of us that the relinquishment of the Life of Reason is irreversible in its consequences, to be recognized at the deepest level of human concern? In fine, it would appear that in his essay on “The Stranger,” Schutz has sold his birthright for a mess of sociological pottage. The atmosphere of these charges is acrid. Little wonder then that almost a year after reading Gurwitsch’s letter, Schutz addresses him as Mr. Gurwitsch. Who is it besides Thales who has fallen into the pit?

It is time for some declarations. This is not a Gurwitsch versus Schutz essay. Although Schutz was and remains my mentor, it was through Schutz that I came into Gurwitsch’s orbit; though I was not a classroom student of Gurwitsch, he was my teacher. I remain faithful to both men and grateful to them. Nor is this a philosophy versus sociology paper. I consider the very
framing of so raw an opposition to be conceptually unsupportable as well as without value. Finally, this is not an “Aha, see how phenomenology is the salvation of sociology” presentation. Rather, I am concerned with several questions of a different order. In what sense is Schutz both a philosopher and a sociologist? How has it happened that since his death, Schutz has come to be associated more closely with the discipline of social science, sociology in particular, than with philosophy? Can Schutz be relegated to the position of a theoretician of symbolic interactionism without serious misrepresentation? Is the work of ethnomethodology Schutz’s claim to sociological success? Is Schutz’s phenomenological alliance with sociology a kind of morganatic marriage? It will be impossible to consider all of these questions in one paper, but I have them in mind in what I have to say about “Alfred Schutz: Philosopher and Social Scientist.” Perhaps the best way to begin is to return to Gurwitsch’s rather violent criticism of “The Stranger.”

In my judgment, Gurwitsch misread Schutz. Gurwitsch was alarmed that Schutz had forsaken philosophy for a formal sociology which did not recognize or understand transcendental questions, a discipline which took for granted the very problems whose understanding was the pivot not only of phenomenology but of Western civilization. Who can fail to appreciate Gurwitsch’s situation? He arrived in the United States in 1940, a refugee from personal, political, and intellectual disaster. Do not mistake these remarks for some kind of psychological apologia; they are intended to explain the urgency which lies at the bottom of Gurwitsch’s misreading. He was utterly convinced of the danger of conceptual drift. If a person of Schutz’s stature as well as background could forget or abandon philosophy, what hope was there for the preservation of those who genuinely sought Truth and for the world in which Truth was the one needful thing? Gurwitsch knew very well from what he had escaped; did he now begin to wonder to what he had escaped? We must examine more closely the bill of particulars of the charges against “The Stranger.”

Gurwitsch writes,

We thought, — I appeal to the philosopher Schutz — that man must be responsible for the world. That is what we learned from our master Husserl . . . And now we learn [from “The Stranger”] that that is not the point at all, that the point is to have recipes which allow one to deal with things. We wanted to understand the world and now we learn that the only thing that matters is a smooth and effortless operation in which certain results can be produced. (1989, p. 70).

Gurwitsch continues:
And I appeal once more to the philosopher Schutz. We both know what it means to make the *consensus communis* and "public opinion" the highest norm. Is it not precisely the function of the philosopher to investigate the things themselves and not to accept *what they say*. Don’t we know that the truth is the unattainable fruit of endless endeavors and not, precisely not, what “one” thinks, knows from hearsay and passes on in verbal form, perhaps making use of advertising and those techniques that psychology puts at our disposal? Isn’t original seeing something very different from hearsay and adaptation (1989, p. 71)?

And finally, for present purposes, Gurwitsch says:

Perhaps you will answer that your article is a sociological study, and as such interested in the *average* and not in the specific problems of those few who are so aware. Then I would ask: why do we find such an interest in the *average* in our times and not in substantive issues? Why does one no longer pose the question concerning truth but only the question concerning the *average opinion*? Who has proven that in these matters statistics provides salvation (1989, p. 72)?

Schutz's answer to these questions is silence. What is called for now is not a correction of Gurwitsch's misreading but rather a positive statement of Schutz's understanding of what he called "a phenomenology of the natural attitude." It is Schutz the philosopher who speaks through his silence. What a priceless effort that silence must have demanded.

Alfred Schutz spoke of his own work as being a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. The level of Husserlian analysis he pursued is that of phenomenological psychology. Of course, he was deeply acquainted with transcendental phenomenology, but he left that, for the most part, to the pursuit of others. Most decisive for Schutz's project — his philosophy of the social sciences — was an eidetic approach to the problems of social reality. His was a staunch effort to trace out how meaning builds the social world of everyday life, establishes the fabric of intersubjectivity, and sustains a world. Without entering the methodological storehouse of phenomenology — epoché, bracketing, reduction, transcendental subjectivity — we can say that, for Schutz, constitution requires a tracing back of what might be called the story of meaning (Husserl speaks of the sedimentation of meaning) to its many levels and layers and, ultimately to its origin. Phenomenology, I would say, is a discipline of origin. In Schutz's own words:
our mind builds up a thought by single operational steps, but in hindsight it is able to look in a single glance at this whole process and its outcome. We can even go a step further: our knowledge of an object, at a certain given moment, is nothing else than the sediment of previous mental processes by which it has been constituted. It has its own history, and this history of its constitution can be found by questioning it. This is done by turning back from the seemingly ready-made object of our thought to the different activities of our mind in which and by which it has been constituted step by step.

This is the kernel of Husserl’s theory of constitution . . . (1962, p. 111).

And now I will give what I trust will be the clinching, final substantial quotation from Schutz. In his essay on “Phenomenology and the Social Sciences,” Schutz writes:

No motive exists for the naive person to raise the transcendental question concerning the actuality of the world or concerning the reality of the alter ego, or to make the jump into the reduced sphere. Rather, he posits this world in a general thesis as meaningfully valid for him, with all that he finds in it, with all natural things, with all living beings (especially with human beings) . . . A special motivation is needed in order to induce the naive person even to pose the question concerning the meaningful structure of his life-world, even within the general thesis . . . If . . . a motivation for leaving the natural attitude is given, then by a process of reflection the question concerning the structure of meaning can always be raised. One can always reactivate the process which has built up the sediments of meaning, and one can explain the intentionalities of the perspectives of relevance and the horizons of interest. Then all these phenomena of meaning, which obtain quite simply for the naive person, might be in principle exactly described and analyzed even within the general thesis. To accomplish this on the level of mundane intersubjectivity is the task of the mundane cultural sciences, and to clarify their specific methods is precisely a part of that constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude of which we have been speaking. Whether one will call this science Intentional Psychology, or, better General Sociology, since it must always be referred back to mundane intersubjectivity, is a quite secondary question (1962, pp. 135–137).

A phenomenology of the natural attitude, done as phenomenological psychology, and performed within the natural attitude is, in Husserlian terms, a rudimentary parallel of a profound level of phenomenological analysis, for as
Schutz states: "... in essence all analyses carried out in phenomenological reduction must retain their validation within the natural sphere" (1962, p. 139). It might be asked whether this is Schutz’s view but not that of Husserl. The answer is given in the last sentence in Schutz’s essay on “Husserl’s Importance for the Social Sciences”: “For Husserl himself has established once and for all the principle that analyses made in the reduced sphere are valid also for the realm of the natural attitude” (1962, p. 149). The constitutive clarification and validation of this phenomenological principle must proceed by way of epoché and, ultimately, transcendental-phenomenological reduction. But what Schutz calls “General Sociology” already heralds a momentous pronouncement: the passage from a deeply reflective sociology to phenomenological analysis is part of the charter of phenomenology. A sociology which comprehends itself is part of a phenomenology of the natural attitude.

Unless the implicit admonitions in these remarks are respected, philosophy becomes social science and sociology becomes phenomenology. With that, the entire discussion becomes absurd. We are speaking of theory in science, in the broadest sense. Nor is our point of view limited to such figures as Simmel, though “How is Society Possible?” is the fulfillment of what I have to say. Let us turn instead to some banal cautions. Edmund Husserl together with every phenomenologist he respected—all the king’s men—making use of all phenomenological method, could not determine the population of the city of Chicago. Nor does any demographic figure, for that matter, have a correlate in the reduced sphere of transcendental subjectivity. There are no yellow pages in the directories of phenomenology to guide us. If you want examples of concrete work by a phenomenologist which merits acknowledgment as General Sociology, read Alfred Schutz. Genuine empirical work does not become phenomenological by virtue of what I have said. But the question of whether method as well as results of method is purely empirical cannot be established by empirical means; that determination brings us to phenomenology. If it is true that philosophy does not change the world, then a curious question arises: What about phenomenology? Does the phenomenological attitude change the world? To the extent that phenomenology changes philosophy, phenomenology changes the world. I do not wish to sound gnomic; instead, I am trying to clarify the limits of being in the natural attitude and attempting to determine the logical moment when the individual transcends the natural attitude.

The phrase “being in the natural attitude” may be misleading unless it is recognized that it is a believing in everyday states of affairs which is at issue. One is not in the natural attitude as one is in Ohio. “In” means believing in. Is there an equivalent believing in if we consider the realm of sociology. The answer is “yes, but.” Both the “yes” and the “but” must be granted their weight. The very meaning of the natural attitude in phenomenological terms is that,
without any self-consciousness or mediation, the person in the natural attitude believes in the reality of there being for him what indeed appears before him: this is naive realism in its most nearly infantile form. Intersubjectivity, real, independent being, history, value, and the expectation of the typified future are all aspects of the taken for granted character of the natural attitude. In this sense, believing in is a decisive part of the natural attitude. The “but” means that such believing in is the most deeply assumed feature of mundane existence; it is the profound presupposition of daily life — without that presupposition the current of mundanity would be negated. In phenomenology believing in is made an object of inspection and interrogation; how radical that inspection is depends on the level of phenomenological analysis, the depth of the methodology employed. Even within Schutz’s phenomenology of the natural attitude, there are distinctions drawn which go beyond the limits of everydayness. For example, Schutz’s concern with “growing older together.” What appears to be a simple observation of and within the life-world proves to be phenomenologically enigmatic.

The language of “growing older together,” from the standpoint of the everyday world is omnipresent: “None of us is getting any younger,” “I thought he’d be older but, my God, he’s ancient,” “we have the whole world ahead of us,” “we bowl together to keep fit,” “the family that values together,” and “grow old with me, the best is yet to be.” Setting aside the commonplaces, the disasters of language, and the short views of poetry, let us turn to Schutz:

... the communicator’s speech ... is, while it goes on, an element common to his and my vivid present, both of which are, ... simultaneous. My participating in simultaneity in the ongoing process of the Other’s communicating establishes therefore a new dimension of time. He and I, we share, while the process lasts, a common vivid present, our vivid present, which enables him and me to say: “We experienced this occurrence together.” By the We-relationship, thus established, we both — he, addressing himself to me, and I, listening to him — are living in our mutual vivid present, directed toward the thought to be realized in and by the communicating process. We grow older together (1962, pp. 219–220).

Within the natural attitude, the language and at least part of the meaning of “growing older together” are recognized. From the standpoint of phenomenological psychology, the meaning-core of the language gives way to the more opaque element of time, which in turn yields the temporal essence of the We-relationship. Time gives way to inner-time, the mundane to the transcendental. Can such a transposition be understood outside of phenomenological analysis? Yes. Apart from Schutz? Yes. Consider some of the work of Clifford
Geertz, such as *Local Knowledge*. Consider that utterly remarkable book by Ronald Blythe, *The View in Winter: Reflections on Old Age*. Blythe's is an essay, I would say, in General Sociology. There are some authors who don't need phenomenology; they are phenomenology.

The concept of "growing older together" leads not only from sociology to temporality but, in introducing Schutz's approach to the "We-relationship," inevitably points to the philosophical problem of intersubjectivity. It has been suggested that whatever merit Schutz's work may possess, it is systemically faulted by a failure he inherits from Husserl: the problem of intersubjectivity remains unresolved. What such irresolution signifies to these critics of phenomenology — citing names is not going to advance the argument — is that if the ground floor step of the stairway of a grand system is missing or ill-constructed, then the entire stairway can lead nowhere. Whether this criticism is justified, it is the case that very few defenders of Husserl on intersubjectivity are to be heard hawking their wares. Husserl, it is no secret, was dissatisfied with the Fifth of his *Cartesian Meditations*, Schutz recorded his objections to it, and if they had misgivings, what more on the subject need be said? Well, a good deal. The philosophy of Husserl is not still another German, multi-volumed system. In fact, it is not a system at all. On intersubjectivity, Schutz is closer, in some ways, to Martin Buber than he is to Edmund Husserl. And despite Schutz's contempt for the later Sartre, one philosophical matter seemed to bring the two thinkers together. Sartre, too, thinks that Husserl's "proof" in the Fifth Meditation founders. That is why Sartre turns to the "look" as the clue to the awareness of the Other. Still, there is a more general response to be made to the opponents of the phenomenological argument for intersubjectivity. It is that the mode of argument utilized by many critics — if the foundation is faulty, the superstructure cannot be trusted — does an injustice to Husserl and to those who follow his path. The mode of argument is rather Aristotelian: fail with A and B is insecure; if B is insecure then surely C is in trouble. But this is not the way of phenomenology. Dorion Cairns once said that by phenomenology Husserl meant whatever he was doing at the time. If Husserl was dissatisfied with the Fifth meditation, it hardly follows that matters could not be reconsidered, that revision of the most fundamental sort could not be tolerated, that if a vertical movement was impractical, a lateral diversion could not be devised.

Our central point should not be enveloped by the fog of intersubjectivity or anything else. It is that sociology, profoundly considered, is already part of a phenomenology of the natural attitude. If I am correct, then why did Gurwitsch misread Schutz's essay "The Stranger"? Gurwitsch was smarter than I am, a far greater phenomenologist than I am, and, for many years, smoked a pipe. What went wrong? I have already set aside psychological interpretations and
indicated the power of Husserl’s *Crisis*. Still, this leaves me unsatisfied. Why did not Gurwitsch say of “The Stranger”: “Ah, an essay in phenomenological psychology.” The reason, in my judgment, is that Gurwitsch – and Schutz as well – was not only a stranger in his American life; he was also and indelibly an exile. Schutz’s essay touches on the widest range of problems relevant to the stranger yet does not consider the very special case of the exile. At the end of his essay, Schutz writes:

The adaptation of the newcomer to the in-group which at first seemed to be strange and unfamiliar to him is a continuous process of inquiry into the cultural pattern of the approached group. If this process of inquiry succeeds, then this pattern and its element will become to the newcomer a matter of course, an unquestionable way of life, a shelter, and a protection. But then the stranger is no stranger any more, and his specific problems have been solved (1964, p. 105).

It is quite otherwise with the exile. His problem is not “specific.” No one was better prepared to write an essay on “The Exile,” but Schutz did not publish such a piece. Perhaps the irony overcame Gurwitsch’s judgment.

If it is true that Schutz has had a greater impact on sociology than on philosophy, then what I have suggested about a deeply reflective sociology already being part of a phenomenology of the natural attitude points to an irony of its own. Schutz would have smiled. In a way, social science becomes Husserl’s *avant-garde*. The question of why phenomenology has not made a greater advance in contemporary philosophy than it has cannot be examined in this essay. Philosophy cannot be comprehended in Dow-Jones Industrial terms. Perhaps a merger with hermeneutics would send phenomenology’s stock soaring. Schutz demanded much of philosophy and of himself; he was wary of movements. He once told me that he had attended some function in Paris, where Merleau-Ponty exclaimed loudly: “The philosopher must be committed!” “Committed to what?,” Schutz responded. He added that Merleau-Ponty made it clear that he did not like Schutz’s intervention. Such catch-words as “commitment” and “relevance” have faded, but the inclination to want them survives. In the nineteen-fifties, to which my remarks are restricted pretty much – in the time from 1951 to 1959, when I knew Schutz – such a phrase as “political correctness” did not exist; what it means has been going on for centuries. Despite the absence of certain terminology, we managed to communicate.

If we follow what may be called, generically, the phenomenological horizon of “growing older together” and the “We-relationship,” we come to the notion of “situation.” Schutz presents the meaning of “situation” in terms of a double
transcendence: that of Nature and that of the social world. First of all, he speaks of a “biographical situation.” Schutz writes:

I find myself in my everyday life within a world not of my own making. I know this fact, and this knowledge itself belongs to my biographical situation. There is, first, my knowledge that Nature transcends the reality of my everyday life both in time and in space. In time, the world of Nature existed before my birth and will continue to exist after my death. . . . I know, furthermore, that in a similar way the social world transcends the reality of my everyday life. I was born into a preorganized social world which will survive me, a world shared from the outset with fellow-men who are organized in groups, a world which has its particular open horizons in time, in space, and also what sociologists call social distance (1962, pp. 329–330).

The transcendencies of “situation” – Nature and Sociality – are what Schutz in other places in his work calls “constants” of human being, ineluctable features of human existence. Yet there is a countervailing force. And here Schutz turns directly to sociology and specifically to W.I. Thomas’s idea of the definition of the situation. Quoting Thomas’s The Child in America (1928), Schutz reminds us that “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (cited in Schutz, 1962, p. 348). Here is the interpretational, the volitional side of man in his situation. The transcendencies are factic aspects of the biographical – indeed of any – situation; the “givens” of Nature and Sociality are nevertheless defined concretely by men in action. Human beings define their “plan of life” and, as Schutz ultimately recognized, their “plan of death.” The contextual, situational philosophy of Schutz is most appealing to social scientists, I believe, but the factic, the transcendent, the humanly chosen and defined are no less decisive philosophical concepts. It is their phenomenological rather than their existential implications which Schutz develops, but in my judgment his appreciation of the more profound, less flashy, roots of those concepts in Kierkegaard’s notion of “indirect communication” is as much a clue to their significance as the more menacing counterparts of these issues in the thought of Husserl. Schutz’s indebtedness to Kierkegaard is not a “hunch” of mine but an interpretation quite adequately validated in Schutz’s Collected Papers. For present purposes, we can safely put aside existential considerations. Schutz thought their legitimate claims to be part of perennial philosophy or, as we shall see shortly, the universal gravity of metaphysics. Ultimately, all definition and all transcendence are in turn transcended. For the motto to his long essay on “Symbol, Reality and Society,” which brings
Volume I of his Collected Papers to a conclusion, Schutz turns to the book of Genesis (40:8): “Do not interpretations belong to God?”

Our conclusion is an effort to avoid the eighth deadly sin: nostalgia. I appeal to St. Augustine. “Present of things past, memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation.” I crave the indulgence of a fourth modality: Present of things imaginable: irreality. This is phenomenology’s parry to those who have lost patience with nostalgia. We move then from situation to being situated, and most immediately to Alfred Schutz. How was he situated in the decade of the fifties, during the time that I knew him? Let us think of Schutz as a teacher at the New School. Without, for the moment, focusing on the Graduate Faculty, the New School as a whole was a combination of mysterious splendors and atrocious inadequacies. Gathered together in its cafeteria, halls, and classrooms were some of the most frenzied, harried, bewildered, brilliant and dumfounded creatures I have ever encountered. Out of the genius of its many came some of the most elegant lunatics fanciable. The wondrous-mad frescoes of Orozco glared down at podiatrists and housewives munching their tunafish sandwiches. Trotsky became emblematic of permanent education. The air had voltage.

And the Graduate Faculty? Its faculty had renown but its students were quite uneven in background, preparation, and intellectual capacity. When I was there, I had as my fellow students Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger. There were other extremely fine minds, many individuals from the Continent as well as people like myself from Brooklyn. The Graduate Faculty was a mélange of students whose range included the acute and, alas, in some small measure, the abysmal. Very likely, I should close with a shower of references to those who were brilliant; but they should be able to take care of themselves by now. Instead, I will recall a particular scene I witnessed in one of Schutz’s classes. For some reason I can no longer remember, Schutz touched on the philosophical problem of death. This sort of theme was far from a regular feature of his teaching, but on this occasion he said something which seemed to catch the especial attention of one student, who could not apparently wait for the usual question period Schutz always held after his lecture. The student was very excited. “Dr. Schultz! Dr. Schultz!,” he cried out. Leaving his podium, Schutz walked to the other end of the room to stand by the agitated student. “Dr. Schultz!,” he cried still again. “Yes,” said Schutz to him deliberately and calmly. “I don’t understand what you mean by death,” the student exclaimed. “I mean, how can there be a philosophy of death? Death is simply death — something mortuaries and actuaries are concerned with. Are you talking about insurance companies?,” the student asked. Schutz gazed into the student’s face while his own face rang the changes of amazement and collapsed in Viennese mirth. “You are joking, you are joking!” Schutz
said. “Oh no,” replied the student, “I’m quite serious. I just can’t understand how there can be a philosophy of death.” “I am speaking of the metaphysical problem of death,” Schutz said. The only place this exchange can go is the fantasy with which I will end.

We are in Manhattan. It is an evening sometime in, say, 1952. Schutz and I are standing at the corner of Sixth Avenue and 12th Street. Remember that in those days the New School for Social Research was on 12th Street between Fifth and Sixth Avenues. The School was not that far from Sixth Avenue. There were others in this scene. If one were to look downtown, Ludwig von Mises could be spotted, leaving the Manufacturer’s Trust Co. (it must be a Friday); Max Weber, searching for a taxi, was standing facing Sixth Avenue, his tightly rolled umbrella pointed directly and fully toward the very gizzard of traffic; I was assured that Georg Simmel was browsing in Dauber and Pine’s Bookshop, not that far away. As Schutz discoursed under a street lamp, a voice could be heard in the near distance. As it grew more distinct and its author visible, as he ran toward us, it became clear that it was the New School student. He was shouting, “Dr. Schultz! Dr. Schultz!”

References