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# Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, Georg Jellinek as Comparative Historical Sociologists

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## I

The discussion by Max Weber on church, sect and mysticism which I introduced in translation in a recent issue of *Sociological Analysis* (1973, 34, 2), is an exceptional example of the different ways four of the greatest German sociologists related to key issues in the domains of the sociology of religion and the forms of religiosity. The chief themes at issue in their colloquy, though not always so plainly stated, were the varied patterns of relations of churches, sects, mysticisms, rationalisms, rationalizations, and secularizations on the roads to modernity. The main, not the only, participants in the colloquium were Ernst Troeltsch, who initiated the discussion by offering a historic paper on Stoic-Christian natural law,[1] Ferdinand Toennies, Georg Simmel, and Weber himself. (A fifth man who figured in the background of these discussions but was not named by any of the discussants was Weber's close friend, Georg Jellinek, of whom we shall speak below.)

First some words about Weber: Once again here, as in many other places in his great work, Weber stands out as a pioneer in what I have called the comparative historical differential sociology of social and cultural process—in *civilizational perspective*. Notwithstanding the fact that all too frequently Weber talks as though his structural views were parallel to those of Troeltsch and Toennies, it proves that his main emphasis is upon the analysis of variable and differential mixes of sociocultural elements which occurred within the distinctively fused wholes of different civilizations. Weber regularly insisted that it was not possible to understand the varieties of religious structures without grasping the central forms of religiosity within the mix of all other orientations and institutions dominant in different societies and civilizational settings.

The sociological—as distinguished from the historical—substance of the following remarks on Toennies and Troeltsch only becomes available if we grasp Weber's way of threading formal and material perspectives. Instead of treating church as an invariant, he chooses to stress the differences between the sect-types of Western church-types and the sect-types of other church structures, such as the Greek church suffused as it had been in acosmic mysticism. Although he is too sparing here in his discussion of the sect-types arising out of the Greek church, he offers very lively passages on the strains of acosmism running through Russian literature and life in the 19th century.

Throughout the 19th century and in the early years of the 20th century there was a deep sense among leading Russian thinkers that the Latin church was alien

[1]See Troeltsch (1910) in ed. (1925) and translation (1975a).

to them and represented a totally different expression of Christianity, one that many orthodox believers deemed heretical.[2] Russian theologians and religious leaders, Weber reminds us, elevated to primacy the idea of the community of all believers in a state of total undividedness, continually preserving its purity and wholeness through the integrity of its faith-acts in the name of *subornost*. In the view of the Slavophiles, Weber hints, Western organization appeared to be rooted in rationalized structures of rule and scholastic theology which were alien to the most profound intentions of Apostolic Christianity. Moreover, Western juridicial structures appeared to be Roman in source and to postulate the separateness of distinct individuals and egoistic wills. Western scholastic theology appeared to be mere rationalism, the breeding ground of the claim to the liberty of conscience in the Protestant Reformation and the "rationalism" of the French Enlightenment and Revolution.

Weber does not refer to all these issues in his foregoing statement; however, his references to Dostoyevsky, Khomiakov, Solovyev and others make it clear that in Weber's view there could be little grasp of these structures of church, sect, and mysticism without a grasp of the distinctive realities which occur within the fused crystallizations of forms and contents in diverse settings. For all of Weber's insistence on processing all these variabilities, or variations into formal frames, he never forgets his commitment to being a *differential sociologist*, one who has an unbelievably keen eye for differences in structures, differences in the mixes of influence, differences in the modalities of fusion of different principles within the structures of society. For Weber, the terms church, sect, mysticism refer to recurrent structural and orientational patterns which arise again and again in varied civilizational, historical settings but always with diverse contents throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. This stress upon the immense influence of varying civilizational settings for the varieties of religious experiences, orientations, communities and associations constitutes one of Weber's greatest contributions to sociology, one which deserves to be given greater weight in further work done in this sphere. The magisterial writings which mark the zenith of Weber's career reveal a strong strain which may truly be called *civilization-analytic*.

## II

Regarding Weber and Troeltsch, a number of recent writers[3] correctly emphasize that Weber's approach to the understanding of sects precedes and yet varies from distinctions proposed, and made famous, by Ernst Troeltsch. As we know,

[2]See the discussions by Kireevsky and Khomiakov in Raeff (ed.), 1966:175-207, 208, 229, respectively; Dostoyevsky, 1879-1880, *The Brothers Karamazov*.

[3]A recent essay by Stephen Berger (1971) puts especially strong stress on Weber's priority over Troeltsch in making the church-sect distinction. Cf. the important studies by Eister (1972); Wilson (1961, 1970, 1971); Greeley (1972). Comparative approaches to sect-like movements and cults are becoming more frequent; cf. Eister (1972). Describing the 1910 colloquium remarks under discussion here as a later version of the original 1906 article, Hill (1973:50) remarks that "Weber broadened his perspective to include religions other than Christianity, among them Judaism and Brahminism, which were seen as 'churches.' " A striking statement of the critical importance for Weber of his researches on American sects, more precisely his 1906 essay, will now be found in John Torrance's thoughtful essay (Torrance, 1974:127-165, esp. 132-133). Torrance writes: ". . . Weber's most decisive move towards

Weber himself emphasized the special case of his own perspective and thesis, and the essay under discussion here expands the proofs and bearings of this difference. But at the same time there is new evidence that the wider and largely unnoticed links among the two men provide clues to perspectives in the sociology of religion which lead us to fresh ways of talking about what I shall here call the *circulatory relations* among churches-sects-societies-cultures in wider societal and civilizational settings.[4] So far as the present statement is concerned, the marks of difference between the emphases of Weber and Troeltsch may be put as follows: Weber is always possessed by the need to establish the variable mixes of elements operating in diverse histories. Clearly, Weber had no simple view of the relations of sub-structure or super-structure or the effects of so-called economic relationships upon which the characteristics of sect movements depend. In the present statement we find Weber taking sharp issue with Toennies for treating these links in too narrow a way. Weber flatly rejects the overgeneralizations of Toennies that the keys to the rise of sects are to be found in the geographic-economic environments, whether urban or rural. Weber's analysis of the paradigmatic sect, the Donatist movement, is offered as a prime illustration to the contrary (see Frend, 1952).

## III

In the main, but not always, Troeltsch's horizons differ from those of Weber. Troeltsch' problematics are essentially concerned with the complex comminglings of two sorts of laws—the one he describes as the *sociological natural laws*, and the other he calls the "*ideal types of laws* presented by idealizing of various kinds." His point is to make clear that neither one of these operates alone, that they continually interpenetrate. Troeltsch is here essentially talking about the interpenetrations occurring between what we would call today social-structural or social-system effects and what we would call cultural-process or cultural-system effects. His language is for us now complex to follow, but the truth is that he did here hit upon a very essential distinction.[5] Beyond that, Troeltsch was almost wholly interested

sociology . . . occurred between *The Protestant Ethic* and *The Protestant Sects*." He then continues: "But though he did not pursue all the implications of his new perception of the importance of the social, that perception was nevertheless there. And it seems to have emerged about the time of Weber's visit to America, which directly inspired *The Protestant Sects*. Weber did not owe it to Simmel, nor to any other colleague or book. Perhaps, like Tocqueville before him, he had been made newly aware of a universal dimension of human life by the immediate experience of American sociability and conformism, and by the greater transparency of a society still at work constructing itself on self-consciously egalitarian principles. Certainly this is what one is invited to infer, on internal evidence, from the essay itself."

Oddly, from my point of view, a perspective which appears to be lacking in Torrance's exceedingly ambitious essay is the one particularly discussed here, the comparative historical *differential sociology —in civilizational perspectives*. A price is paid by Torrance for the omission of this horizon. My illustrations of the resultant breaks in the circuit of some of his extended arguments will have to be reserved for another occasion.

[4]An approach to an insight of dynamic processes in sect-church developments will be found in an essay by Mauss (1968); cf. also Wilson (1971).

[5]In the view of Roland Robertson (1970:117-118), Troeltsch was driven to discuss the church-sect-mysticism distinctions by the facts of the Reformation. Another view seems to me to be suggested by the evidence of key writings by Troeltsch, especially the one on which Weber is here commenting, the essay

in the ways in which, within Christian civilization and the history of Christian society in Europe, certain developments had occurred which had the distinctive crystallizations which he describes under the heading of church, sect and mysticism. At no point in the essay on Stoic-Christian Natural Law does he appear to suppose that the phenomena involved occur everywhere under different guises and in idiomatic dress. Troeltsch pays little attention here to the possibility that church-type, sect-type, and mysticism constitute modalities which are general in character and are not merely the outcomes of the peculiar characteristics of Western civilization. His dominant concern was in the structures of social activity and thought which emerged out of an earlier matrix of Stoic and Christian natural law. There is no doubt that he had made a contribution which remains to be fully appreciated by other than experts in his work. However, there is also no surprise in the fact that his views have not had the resonance among sociologists which Weber's views have had. It is Weber who does in fact offer us evidence that the structures of church and sect prove to be functions of more complex movements at both the societal and communalistic or the collectivistic levels of process. Under certain circumstances, where the concept of church is profoundly communalistic, as Weber proposes it was in Russia, there is an enormous stress upon the holiness of the primal undivided community, and there is therefore a very different accent to be found whenever any kind of dissension emerges, and when sectarian groups appear on the scene. In those areas and at those times in which the societal principles have taken hold, where the *Gesellschaft*-like structures prevail, there sectarianism will manifest itself very differently (Weber, 1904-1905; 1906).

It may also be noted that Weber has a wonderfully clear perception that there are continuing passages from the sect to the church, from the church to the sect. There is very little in the views of Weber, or for that matter in Troeltsch, which would require so many contemporary sociologists to be as static as they are in their way of conceiving the relations of sect and church. One must, in this connection, be grateful to those recent researchers, notably Bryan Wilson (1970) and Roland Robertson (1970), who have enriched our appreciation of the processual aspects in the vicissitudes of sects, denominations, and so on (also P. Berger, 1954).

There is one sense in which Weber does not relate to the full scope of Troeltsch's discussion in the present statement. I refer to the fact that Troeltsch has a stronger stress on the disengagements from the matrix of new structures which are neither churches or sects, but which constitute new societal and cultural entities that now are fused in decidedly secular ways. Weber does not actually touch upon this aspect of the subject in the contribution he makes to the very rich discussion.

on the Stoic-Christian Natural Law, delivered at Frankfurt in 1910; also see the essay on "Christian Natural Law" which appeared in the encyclopedia, *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (1st edition, 1913). The decisive phenomenon for Troeltsch, as for most other leading German theologians, philosophers, and historians throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries seems to have been the institutionalization of primitive Christianity. These writers and thinkers wanted to know how the charismatic fellowship of the apostolic Church had been bureaucratized, how an otherworldly "sect" gave rise to the Roman Church. In this respect there had been consistency of interest from at least the 18th century forward. The stress is already strong in Hegel's early theological writings; cf. Hegel (1949). Others who emphasized this theme include Overbeck (1941, 1963) Harnack (1910, 1962); Sohm (1970); Schweitzer (1956, 1960); Hatch (1957). A particularly exciting dispute on this issue developed between Sohm and Harnack, for which see Harnack (1910:121-186).

However, it would be an oversight not to mention the fact that this approach is prominent in earlier treatments of this theme by Weber, especially his *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904-5) and his 1906 essay on "Churches and Sects in America."[6] These observations lead us to an unduly neglected fact about a critical force for all who had wider interests in the areas under discussion here, that is, the immense influence of the work of Georg Jellinek.[7] Weber himself tells us that he first came to have a strong interest in the special features of the influence of the Calvinist sects after having read Jellinek's outstanding essay on the formation of the idea of the rights of man. On another occasion, incidentally, Weber tells us that it was Jellinek who offered him very critical clues for a new point of departure in dealing with the differential structures of authority in his *Economy and Society* (Roth in Weber, 1968 I:lxxxiii; Bendix and Roth, 1971:308-312).

## IV

With regard now to the essay itself, the main themes explored by Weber may be put in the following terse propositions and equations:

a. The distinction of church and sect does not refer to a fixed invariant relation which everywhere manifests itself in the same form and with the same content.

b. The term *church* refers to a range of church-types just as the term *sect* refers to a range of sect-types.

c. Every church will have the characteristics of wider societal and civilizational settings and will prove to be an actualization of one or another central structural or orientational emphasis. In this respect there is a difference between the Western Latin Roman Church and the Greek Orthodox Church and, indeed, there are differences between the Latin Roman Church and the Calvinist Church as churches.

d. There is nothing in principle which militates against the possibility of sects being transformed into churches or denominations.

e. Each church engenders a distinctive set of sect-types. There is, in short, a link between the church-type and the sect-type as a result of the persistences of certain cultural orientations, often in some more extreme form. Moreover, the relation among church and sect proved to be a function of wider societal, cultural and civilizational settings.

f. The central patterns and outcomes of the *circulatory processes* that operate among church, sect, society, culture are likely to be different, depending upon the character of the mixes in these fused wholes.

g. The most critical determinant in the *circulatory process* is the openings available to sects within the societal or cultural structures. Where these openings are considerable, as they were in the American colonies, we have the spread through the wider society of structures and principles that were initially hatched in the relation to church.

h. The forms and degrees of irradiation arising from new cultural and social nuclei vary notably in their scope and pace as a result of unexpected context.

[6]Weber (1906, edition of 1956). For a report of a talk by Weber to a Heidelberg group soon after his return from the United States, see J. Leo in R. Koenig & J. Winckelmann (eds.), (1963). Valuable archival materials bearing on Weber's observations in America—especially his letters to Harnack—will be found in Mommsen's informative essay (1971).

[7]For clues to Jellinek's influence, see Heller (1937), 379. G. Roth in Weber (1968), I, lxxi, lxxxiii; Honigsheim (1968), 11, 68-69, 90-91, 105, 122, 126; Bendix and Roth (1971), 380-312.

As we have noted above, the reference to church and mysticism in Russia is a very telling illustration of several of Weber's key points: the extraordinary diversity of social and cultural principles that may infuse different institutional frameworks; the powerful interplays of church-society-"secular" life and culture. One has to read between Weber's lines to grasp what he is telling us about "dialectic" in the sense of "circulatory" relations among church-sect-society-and culture in Russia, the Roman Catholic cultural areas and the territories of Lutheran and Calvinist stamp.

One might say, in the language developed in this essay, that the issue which most powerfully excited various German theorists and scholars of the relation of church, sect and of modern society was the strong evidence that the sectarian structures had played a very large part in the modernization or transformation of the critical societal structures and orientations of England and the American colonies. From the outset many notable German thinkers were fascinated by the differences between the so-called "Anglo-Saxon" styles of life and the forms within which they lived and the forms which they knew. Their sense was that although Germany had had its Reformation and its Luther and had its official church, it had not undergone the degree of permeation of the wider societal structures by the sect formations and Reformation principles which was to be a mark of the Calvinist culture-areas. In the so-called "Anglo-Saxon" countries sectarian movements and outlooks had evidently proved to be the transformative influences which issued in many of the foremost innovations in political structures and social and religious consciousness (Weber, 1904-1905; Schulze-Gaevernitz, 1906).

Weber observed that Jellinek was the one who had opened his eyes to the extent of the influence of the Protestant sect in the transformation of the wider society. In the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber happened to place the emphasis on the extraordinary importance of the innerworldly asceticism in respect to the spread of the spirit of capitalism and, indeed, into the spread of institutions and habits, ways of life, forms of conduct, that were in accord with the requirements of the new sorts of enterprises and activities that were coming into being. He did not there concern himself notably with the precise bearings of Jellinek's arguments. However, in *Economy and Society* there is a deeper penetration of Jellinek's theses and we find Weber drawing rather more heavily upon Jellinek for explaining the differences in the political structures of "East" and "West" and the extent to which pluralizations of polities and of political outlooks were enhanced by the circulatory effects in society.

Unhappily, Weber does not here discuss in any detail the sects which issued from the Russian church, society, culture, structure. Yet it is apparent that the Russian church had sects which were within the spirit of the wider Russian social arrangements and culture. Russian churches tended to move toward accentuating the emphasis on mystical fellowship, acosmic love, and absolute communalism. There did not exist the same kind of opening of the Russian sect to the wider society. However, the Russian sect continued to be a very significant influence on

[8]See again Roth in Weber (1968), I, lxxxiii; Torrance (1974) now questions the actual extent of Weber's debt to Jellinek here.

Russian cultural leaders and, actually, the Russian sect with all of its very intense concentration on unity did have its effect on the imperial circles, and, indeed, the Czar himself. But the monocratic character of the wider society of Czarist Russia in the 19th century did not encourage the emergence of sects which could diffuse rationalism and notions of the rights of men and citizens through *circulatory process* at the societal level. The newer views had to be borrowed or adapted from the West.

By encouraging us to put questions of this scope and form, Weber, Troeltsch, and Jellinek have provided us firm bases for applying comparative, historical, and civilizational perspectives for freshly studying the varieties of patterned relations of societies, cultures, churches, sects, mysticisms, rationalisms, rationalizations, indeed all the processes which occur in the passages between traditionalism and modernity.

## V

It hardly seems possible to end this discussion without relating to two strongly relevant contexts which will involve our introducing some notable developments and variations of the foregoing remarks in respect to both "sect" and mysticism.

### A.

The first passage involves the very substantive analysis of "Sect, Church, and Democracy" in section 14 of Chapter 15 of *Economy and Society*. Here Weber shifts his perspective and varies his accents at several points before he has completed this dense discussion. He begins the section by seeming to talk in an "essentialist manner" about the primary "sociological" sense of the word "sect." His closing part, however, finds Weber returning to some of Jellinek's themes and then proceeding to rear on this base some powerfully stated, even provocative, propositions, in a manner which recalls the last pages of his *Protestant Ethic*. Limitations of space forbid full review on this occasion of the details of these arguments, especially of the powerful and sweeping transitions from Jellinek's outlooks to his own more highly charged statements. Here it must suffice to cite selected sentences from the conclusions of the remarkable section:

> *Thus the consistent sect gives rise to an inalienable personal right of the governed as against any power, whether political, hierocratic or patriarchal. Such freedom of conscience may be the oldest Right of Man—as Jellinek has argued convincingly*; at any rate, it is the most basic Right of Man because it comprises all ethically conditioned action and guarantees freedom from compulsion, especially from the power of the state. In this sense the concept was as unknown to Antiquity and the Middle Ages as it was to Rousseau's social contract with its power of religious compulsion. *The other Rights of Man or civil rights were joined to this basic right*, especially the right to pursue one's own economic interests, which includes the inviolability of individual property, the freedom of contract, and vocational choice. This economic right exists within the limits of a system of guaranteed abstract rules that apply to everybody alike. All of these rights find their ultimate justification in the belief of the Enlightenment in the workings of individual reason which, if unimpeded, would result in the at least relatively best of all worlds, by virtue of Divine providence and because the individual is best qualified to know his own interests. This charismatic glorification of "Reason," which found a characteristic expression in its apotheosis by Robespierre, is the last form that charisma has adopted in its fateful historical course. *It is clear that these*

> *postulates of formal legal equality and economic mobility paved the way for the destruction of* all patrimonial and feudal law in favor of abstract norms and hence indirectly of bureaucratization. It is also clear that they facilitated the expansion of capitalism. The basic Rights of Man made it possible for the capitalist to use things and men freely, just as the this-worldly asceticism—adopted with some dogmatic variations—and the specific discipline of the sects bred the capitalist spirit and the rational "professional" (*Berufsmensch*) who was needed by capitalism (Weber, 1968, III:1209-1210).

This section in *Economy and Society* has the air of being as consistent, coherent, and comprehensive as anything by Weber on the subject of the sect. It is, however, to be noted that its tone and character are quite different from the replies to Troeltsch and Toennies which Weber presented in the first meeting of the German Society of Sociology at Frankfurt in 1910. The turn given to Weber's reflections on that occasion do appear to represent a breakthrough into comparative civilizational horizons which are distinctly his own and which poignantly reveal Weber in another aspect of his life-long effort to achieve a comprehensive differential sociology of sociocultural process and human action—in comparative historical and civilizational perspective.

B.

Our last theme in these pages relates to Weber's treatment of the third notion in Troeltsch's paper, "mysticism" especially the notion of *innerworldly mysticism* about which too little has so far been said in the literature.

Troeltsch does not make it easy for anyone who wishes to follow the windings of his thought in this analysis. He is hardly clear in his passages from a structural point of view to his interest in predominantly intellectual history. Nonetheless we discover that Troeltsch is aware of the crossings of mysticism and sect in the late-Medieval and early modern era. Thus it proves that Troeltsch does perceive the important role that mysticism played in the passages toward the illuminous sectarian groups and the extensions of the notion of reason and civil liberties. In a sense it is surprising that Troeltsch's remarks on mysticism here did not appear to prompt Weber to a larger response. One aspect of this is of some significance.

From the wider civilizational point of view I have been adopting in these remarks, stronger emphasis would need to be given to one key fact which Weber himself failed to give due recognition. Weber was so intent upon establishing the unique predominance in the West of the penetration and remaking of the world to innerworldly asceticism that he failed to give enough weight to another fact which he no less than Troeltsch implicitly recognized. Weber does not here or elsewhere in his work sufficiently stress the significance of *innerworldly mysticism as contrasted with otherworldly mysticisms.*[9]

From my own point of view it comes to be imperative to expand and modify Weber's formula. I would say that only the modern post-Reformation West saw

[9]I am happy to acknowledge the suggestions here of a stimulating essay on innerworldly mysticism by my student, David McCloskey, now completing his doctorate at the University of Oregon. McCloskey makes exceedingly lively use of some of my previous writings, especially those which explore the significance of the changed images of "conscience" for a variety of cultural traditions in the modern West.

the simultaneous, if conflictful, breakthrough to and legitimation of *innerworldly mysticism* as well as innerworldly asceticism. So far as I can now see, the recorded history of civilizations offers no precedent or parallel to this double and simultaneous breakthrough of transformative religious orientations within the "world." In any event, these two orientations to "Religion" and "World" nowhere received the same degree of elaboration and legitimation as they did in the West. This fact must surely be an important clue and testimony to the restless dynamic character of Western cultural and social life.

Another critical feature of this development was that these two orientations of innerworldly asceticism and innerworldly mysticism recurrently underwent different fusions and de-fusions. Indeed, differences in the elaborations of the various branches of Protestantism prove to be differences in the ways in which these two were related. Neither innerworldly asceticism nor innerworldly mysticism were as ramified or as articulated in Lutheran Germany as they were in the Puritan and mystical sectarian strains in England and North America. This stands out strongly in the materials I have gathered for the unfolding of different stresses associated with the expression of the moral consciousness and conscience. As I now see it, it hardly seems possible to understand the transformations through which modern religious and other cultural expressions have gone without carefully exploring the relations in the cultural traditions and "philosophies of life" of these two orientational horizons and commitments.

Also, it is the simultaneous, if conflictful, legitimation of the two orientations which helps us understand that matters never seem to be going well with us in the West when the two orientations are radically separated from one another or appear to work at cross purposes. Our own days are proof of this. Clearly now those who are committed to following the ways of the "spirit" pursue innerworldly mysticism in a great variety of ways, rejecting all of those cultural expressions believed to be profoundly connected with *innerworldly asceticism*.

A word may be allowed about the difference in this regard from the pre-Reformation era. Although a great deal more needs to be done about exploring the relations of the mixes of asceticisms and mysticisms in the medieval era, it is already apparent that the medieval church never accepted the foundation on which the post-Reformation world was to rest. The medieval world had various blends of *otherworldly* asceticism and *otherworldly* mysticism. Neither innerworldly asceticism nor innerworldly mysticism were given consistent encouragement in that era. A critical juncture in the medieval world comes when new strainings toward innerworldly mysticism and innerworldly asceticism asserted themselves. One sees this clearly in the response of the Church to new sects and intentional communities which come to the fore in the 13th and 14th centuries. The Church strongly opposed the various forms of spiritualities. Equally strongly, it opposed the Beguine movement which foreshadowed a thrust to innerworldly asceticism. The established medieval image of the state of perfection ruled out the possibility that the world could be the setting and arena for the pursuit and achievement of that state.

Elsewhere in my writings I have sought to survey some of the powerful traces of innerworldly mysticism on modern and contemporary cultural and religious movements. In particular, in my "Self-Images and Systems of Spiritual Direction

in the History of European Civilization," I have attempted to illustrate some of the ways in which what I have there described as "inner-light mysticism of the transmoral conscience" has constituted a central core of several of the dominant cultural traditions and social developments of modern Western civilization. These developments include illuminist or "inner-light" democracy—now collectivist and levelling in stress, the liberties of conscience, revivalism. If, as I believe, Protestantism was to witness in different proportions the unleashing of innerworldly mysticisms, we have new clues which may help us to understand the complex developments of the last two centuries. In making this suggestion, I go beyond Weber's expressed views—but I venture ahead in his spirit.[10]

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[10]It is not possible in these pages to offer a needed review of Weber's characterizations of the future as he envisaged it. The following passage may help to suggest an aspect of the theme important for our purposes: "The general result of the modern form of thoroughly rationalizing the world and the way of life, theoretically and practically, in a purposive manner, has been that religion has been shifted into the realm of the irrational . . . The unity of the primitive image of world, in which everything was concrete magic, has tended to split into rational cognition and mastery of nature, on the one hand, and into mystic experiences, on the other. The inexpressible contents of such experiences remain the only possible 'Beyond,' added to the mechanism of a world robbed of gods. In fact, the Beyond remains the incorporeal and metaphysical realm in which individuals possess the holy" (Weber, 1946:282).

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*Corrigenda*

In the article by Stephen G. Wieting "An Examination of Intergenerational Patterns of Religious Belief and Practice" (*SA* 1975, 36,2:137-149) the following references should be appended: Berger, Peter L. 1969. The Sacred Canopy. Garden City: Doubleday. Berger, Peter L. and T. Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City: Doubleday. Heise, David R. 1969. "Separating reliability and stability in test-retest correlation." *American Sociological Review* 34:93-101. Holsti, Ole R. 1969. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Uspensky, B.A. 1974. "The influence of language on religious consciousness." *Semiotica* 10:177-189. Wallace, Robert K. 1971. The Physiological Effects of Transcendental Meditation. Los Angeles: International Student Meditation Society. Wallace, Walter (ed.). 1969. Sociological Theory. Chicago: Aldine. Yinger, J.M. 1969. "A structural examination of religion." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 8:88-99.