3

A Revolutionary Discipline[1]

by Stanley Diamond

"The science of culture," concluded Tylor, "is essentially a reformer's science." I would suggest that anthropology is something more—a revolutionary discipline. This does not make anthropology any the less a science; on the contrary, it is more fully a science precisely because it strives toward a more spacious form of knowing, of "sciencing," and is, therefore, a most potent tool for cultural criticism. Anthropology has, in itself, the possibility of becoming a modern metaphysics (in Collingwood's sense), a science of sciences that may inquire into the nature of history and man, for the sake of man and in his name. "Of all human sciences," wrote Rousseau in the preface to his *Discourse On The Origin of Inequality*, "the most useful and most imperfect appears to be that of mankind: and I will venture to say, the single inscription on the Temple of Delphi, contained a precept more difficult and more important than is to be found in all the huge volumes that moralists have ever written."

The anthropological habit of mind is synthetic, not merely analytic: it looks for wholes, patterns, processes, and relationships among the various aspects of culture and between cultures, and it ferrets out and examines cultural first assumptions. It is historical: we take the deep past seriously; we speak for societies that cannot speak for themselves; and we cherish the things men make—we are preservers not destroyers. We are specialists in tradition in an age that is growing traditionless. Although careerism and slick professionalism have made their inroads among us, we are still largely self-selected to study people off the mainstream of contemporary civilization. We think enough of such people to live among them, to learn from and to respect them, and in their light to examine ourselves and our society. We come close to being real citizens of the world, not merely adherents of an abstract and legal concept of world government. In this final phase of the era of nation-states, not necessarily of nationalities, such on adherence can be a dangerous frame of mind. We are, in other words, marginal in temperament; we are sharply aware of the narrowing chances of cultural variation in the modern world and of the loss of customs and languages. We worry about such matters. We are not easily taken in by political propaganda or advertisements for progress. I think that we are repelled by such slogans as "Progress is our *only* product," and most of us would probably associate ourselves with Lévi-Strauss when he wrote: "Civilization manufactures monoculture like sugar-beet."

But let me approach this definition of the anthropological perspective more systematically. We are engaged in a revolutionary discipline, as I have claimed, because of our ancestry. Modern anthropology is a child of the European Enlightenment, the axial age of the modern consciousness. The collapse of feudalism had, of course, destroyed many fixed medieval assumptions about the nature of man, the position of man in society, and the position of the earth in the cosmos. Two intricately connected traditions, which have since polarized the thinking of anthropologists without ever completely dividing it, and which can therefore be described as ambivalent, began to emerge clearly in the 18th century, throughout western Europe but most notably in France. Rousseau, above all, but also Monbaddo, the early Herder, and Schiller, typically represent the *retrospective* approach—that is, the conscious search in history for a renewed and basic sense of the possibilities of human nature and of culture, not only in response to the fall of feudal ideology but in contrast to the nascent modern realities that were being created by the revolutionary bourgeoisie. The preceding Age of Discovery had introduced the West to the primitive world, and this became the fulcrum for the effort to understand the contemporary scene in a Europe that had, through the late Renaissance and Reformation, been growing increasingly civilized and enlightened even before the Enlightenment itself. The Age of Discovery held a constant image of another aspect of humanity before the Europe that was beginning to break out of medievalism, to look outward in space, and to free itself of the then dogmatic Catholic cosmology, an image shaped by a growing awareness of mankind's primitive past. Montaigne and Camoëns in the 16th century, and later Dryden and then Pope had responded with a more or less sophisticated, more or less sentimental, but always arresting, primitivism. More systematic and balanced formulations were to succeed theirs. The direction, and the purpose, were clearly marked by Rousseau, who, in questioning the credentials of missionaries as chroniclers of savage tribes ("for the study of Man there are requisite gifts which are not always the portions of the Saints"), called upon "the scientific academies to send expeditions composed of trained and genuinely *philosophical* observers to all savage countries, that they might compose at leisure, a natural, moral, and political history of what they have seen. By such a study a new world would be disclosed, and by means of it, we should learn to understand our own." So wrote Rousseau.

The Age of Discovery provided opportunities for direct scrutiny of radically different peoples, and thus foreshadowed today's field work and participant observation. The latter technique, the basic methodological contribution of anthropology, is an extension of the notion of the Romantic historians that sympathy with "the object of study" is essential to historical understanding. The majority of

[1] Portions of this paper appear in a longer study, "The Uses of the Primitive," in Primitive Views of the World, ed. S. Diamond (Columbia University Press: New York, 1964), pp. v–xxix.

subsequent historians of any stature, whether or not associated directly with the Romantic tradition, itself a German aspect of the Enlightenment, have accepted this principle of empathy as a necessary prerequisite to historical knowledge. As Marc Bloch (1953:26), the great French historian of feudalism, put it:

> Behind the features of landscape, behind tools or machinery, behind what appear to be the most formalized documents, and behind institutions, which seem almost entirely detached from their founders, there are men, and it is men that history seeks to grasp.

The assumption is that as members of the same species human beings are capable of interpreting the inwardness of the acts of others; historical knowledge is, therefore, a form of *communication,* analagous to immediate human transactions *in vivo*. The historian has the a priori confidence that his humanity is equal to the task of registering differences; and that is not the only, but it is the critical element in human communication. Thus the absolute prerequisite of the historical consciousness is an unrelenting exploration of the self, as it exists, and as it may be imagined to exist. The conceptualization of another culture, or of another period in history, is the result of the interaction of the sense of self with the artifacts of another time and place. For this reason the possibilities of conceptualizing any primitive society (indeed any society anywhere) are inexhaustible. The intent and position of the observer are critical variables. Portraits may differ in emphasis, but if they are faithful to the data they examine, and if their purposes are clear, they will not be contradictory but complementary. For example, 19th-century anthropology scarcely touches the problem of war, whereas in the last decade we have become increasingly focused on the nature, extent, and definition of war, and the anatomy of human conflict generally. This is hardly surprising when we consider that the 19th century, although marked by a few colonial and civil struggles, was, relatively speaking, an era of international amity in the Euro-American purview. The ultimate problem of the 20th century has directed our attention, as anthropologists, to primitive warfare, in order "to understand our own," as if in response to Rousseau's dictate. The conclusion presently in the air (Malinowski made the point a generation ago), seems to be that such warfare is qualitatively distinct from the modern species. That is, abstract, ideological conflicts together with mass, secular means of extermination are unknown in primitive society. Primitive war consists in heavily ritualized skirmishes (Malinowski refused to describe them as war) in which the taking of a life is an occasion—not an abstract, impersonal, psychically dissociated act.

It seems clear that as human society develops the intricacy and pertinence of our images of past societies increase, rather than otherwise. The distinctions in these images of primitive or other historical societies are, in the broader sense, instrumental: we describe the system with a continuous redefinition and refinement of problems as they exist in our time. Of course, incompetence and dishonesty can assume the guise of historical knowledge but the reference here is to serious work, by students who possess no *extraordinary* human foibles.

There is, then, no final or static or exclusively objective picture of primitive society. *We* snap the portrait, using film of different sensitivity for different purposes. Moreover, there is no really sophisticated portrait of primitive society which can be transmitted to us by an actor from within the system, precisely because it is our experience of civilization that leads us to see problems (for us) where he perceives routine, and to pose questions that the primitive person is unlikely to ask about his own culture. The difficulties, for example, that beset direct human communication (as opposed to the multiplication of mechanical means of communication) in contemporary industrial society are foreign to primitive cultures. Because of the lack of experience of civilization, these difficulties are probably beyond primitive conception. Therefore, it is only a representative of our civilization who can, in adequate detail, document the differences, and help create an idea of the primitive which would not ordinarily be constructed by primitives themselves. That our notions of the primitive society are filtered through the anthropologist's consciousness does not make them any less "objective" or valid. The complementarity of systems, the possibility of different, yet independently consistent, purposive interpretations, faithful to the data, is in the very nature of historical knowledge, and, as the "hard" scientists know, Neils Bohr has argued that complementarity is in the very nature of our knowledge of physical systems.

In undertaking participant observation, anthropologists are, then, in the Romantic tradition of historical knowledge, which is in turn based upon the retrospective tradition of the Enlightenment, a tradition which found its living laboratory in the Age of Discovery. The eagerness with which anthropologists accept the canons of participant observation in small communities testifies to something beyond mere pride of technique. It is, I believe, the sign of an attitude that anthropologists, as civilized individuals, share about the inadequacy of civilized human associations. Anthropologists frequently claim that the more or less primitive peoples whom they encounter in the field are more intensely human than the folks back home. Given the personalistic mode of primitive society, and the usages flowing from it, this is, of course, not surprising. The book, *In the Company of Man,* is in this respect quite typical; a number of anthropologists, representing a broad spectrum of areal and topical interests, converge to a single opinion about the extraordinary character of their informants: they are portrayed as expressive, insightful, dignified, deeply individuated, and so on. In other works, Colin Turnbull, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Elizabeth Marshall Thomas, Monica Wilson, Knut Rasmussen, Peter Freuchen, and Laura Bohannan, to name a few, revel in the complex humanity of primitive peoples.

This is, on the whole, in sharp contrast to the more technical and professionally fashionable aspects of anthropological work. All too often, the forms of society which are studied in such work are not integrated with the state of cultural being described in more personal statements. But the mere cataloging, or even systematic linking of institutions and artifacts, is inadequate unless the effort to reproduce the social consciousness, the cultural being of the people who live and produce in their modality, is made. Every technique available must, of course, be used in these efforts, but what does it avail us if the techniques become ends in themselves? If we detach the social forms and tools from persons and arrange and rearrange them in the service of this or that method, typologically, or as abstract, deductive models, we lose touch with concrete social reality, with the actual imprecisions of human behaviour, and with its atcual meaning at a particular time. The merely logical elaboration of kinship, cosmological, or linguistic systems that we may impose upon a people does not necessarily reflect the consciousness of the actors; it may, in fact, lead to grotesque notions of behavior if translated into behavioral equivalents. The abstract concern with the *evolution* of the forms of energy, which represents no encountered *historical* sequence, is similarly irrelevant —as opposed, for example, to a description of what it means to make and use and control a primitive tool in contrast to pushing a button on an automatic lathe, or working in a coal mine. The study of cultural apparatus finds its basic meaning in the attempt to understand the social consciousness

which it both reflects and creates. Otherwise, the study of man is not the study of man, but the study of social, ideological, economic, and technical forms, a sort of cultural physics. The end does not, however, lie in technique, or in system building, but in the effort to understand those who are, by virtue of what they have created, different from ourselves. As a young sociologist (Stein 1963:125) wrote recently, in criticizing Parsonian and related systematics:

> [They failed] to touch upon an entire vast realm of the industrial experience, horror: [they failed] to comprehend either the collective horrors or the personal horrors which certain features of industrial society almost necessarily involve. What may be needed is a 'sociology of horror' in which social science tries to be honest with the industrial world and with itself.

Moreover, the mere pursuit of forms obscures our understanding of functional equivalents, to which diverse forms may be assimilated. Hence, our broader sense of historical levels suffers and we do not do justice, for example, to the question; What is it like to move in a human and natural world of kinship, as opposed to the technical strata of civilized society? The study of the fantastic array of irreducible cultural forms which men have invented is, of course, worthwhile in itself—they are the reason for being of museums and the occasion for aesthetic contemplation—but social function and human context remain essential for the study of man.

When anthropologists, or people in related disciplines who learned the method from us just as we learned it from the Romantic historians, undertake participant observation in their own societies, we may interpret this as both a professional and personal effort to create and explore human ties that are highly restricted, attenuated, or specialized in the contemporary industrial milieu. The very *need* for field work among people of our own society is, of course, a symptom of dissociation, and not merely an imperative of social complexity, since field work among the middle class is done, for example, by middle-class intellectuals. More often than not they are shocked by what they learn—as were Seeley, Sim, and Loosely in their investigation of Crestwood Heights. This implies a degree of social and human ignorance about ourselves (I do not mean that pejoratively; we all share it) that is unimaginable among primitive persons. The proliferation of psychological counsellors of every conceivable type, not shamans, not dramatists, not creators of meaning, but adjustors, those fragile safety valves for the emotional underground of our rationalizing civilization, is a parallel symptom of the hardening, narrowing, and formalization of human associations.

Rousseau, the parent of our retrospective tendency, had already described this condition when he spoke of "the elaborate structure of pretense and accommodation, the keeping up of appearances, the tribute which the vanity of one leads him to pay to the vanity of the other, in order that he may receive a return in kind." "The savage," wrote Rousseau, "has his life within himself, civilized man in the opinions of others." We may formulate this more sophisticatedly as follows: in contemporary civilization the man tends to dissolve into the status or role; among primitives, new statuses are assimilated to the man, who grows to encompass them through crisis rites (or their equivalents), ritual dramas that may be psychologically and physically painful but which give him a series of brilliant moments in a living drama surrounded by a chorus of kinsmen. Henry James also understood the modern situation. In *The Private Life* he dissects a character who, "though a master of all the social graces, had *no* private life; he ceased to exist altogether when not in society —when no longer an object of the admiring attention of others."

Participant observation is, in our society, an effort to get behind this infinite regression of social masks which hyper-civilized sociologists, involved in a reified maze of role and status studies, mistake for personal reality and a sort of eternal human truth. Just as anthropologists, as representatives of civilization, have a need to construct an idea of the primitive, so they participate in primitive societies in order to tell us (sometimes the notes are published) what it is like to abandon oneself to a human encounter, and, when engaging in field work in our own society, what it is like simply to seek a human encounter.

The Enlightenment generated a version of the primitive, related to the developing criticism of nascent modern culture of some of its most distinguished thinkers. Even Sam Johnson, a sophisticate and skeptic to his toes, while deriding Boswell's intellectual affair with Rousseau, joined the critical chorus in his harangue against predatory property, acquisitiveness, and the growing divorce from nature. Correlatively, the Enlightenment was the initiation period of a modern vision of an evolving secular civilization. Reinforced by the new techniques that seemed to be at hand for the control of the natural environment, flushed by the possibilities of a new science rooted in Newton, Bacon, and Locke, the English forerunners of the Enlightenment, the Encyclopedists in general sought an empirically derived, rational, and logical periodization of the laws of nature and society, and the revelation of a New Man, freed of all past superstition and prejudice. This prospective trend in Enlightenment thought, this evolutionary thrust into the future was, of course, related to its apparent opposite, the retrospective concern with a more permanent definition of the species and the realization of human needs in an appropriate social environment. Enlightenment thought plunged into the past in order to develop a more viable sense of the future—and all fictional or philosophic utopias, whether satirical or visionary, have since based themselves on some theory of a constant human nature, together with a notion of the pre-civilized condition of man. Indeed, a utopia detached from these twin pillars—a sense of human nature, and a sense of the primitive—becomes a nightmare, since humanity must then be conceived as infinitely adaptable and as incapable of historic understanding or self-amendment. Interestingly enough these nightmare utopias are usually either extensions of the shape of contemporary industrial society—as in the works of Zamatian, Huxley, and Orwell—or they adopt fantastic means in order to transcend the modern condition—mutations, applied eugenics, and so on. But it is history in the anthropological perspective that holds the key, not science fiction.

Enlightenment thinkers tended to move in one or another of its major streams. Rousseau, already alienated by the rising bourgeoisie, the new urbanism, the pervading commercialism and acquisitiveness, the droning bureaucracies, and the estrangement of man from natural and human rhythms, devoted most of his energies to the retrospective search for the means of uniting technical education and a more fully human socialization, and for the role of human volition in the formation and acceptance of government. But it is important to recall that this was—despite the epigrammatic Voltaire—a matter of emphasis: Rousseau never counselled a return to any historically specific primitive condition; that was a "deduction in the manner of his adversaries," as he put it, and such a return he dismissed as impossible. But he did wonder that men should have abandoned that relatively creative life which we would probably designate as early Neolithic. Yet he answers the question with surprising adequacy, generally foreshadowing the evolutionary prehistorians Gordon Childe, Graham Clarke, *et al.* Rousseau spoke consistently of the perfectability of man. He believed in the possibility and necessity of progress. But he

recognized that certain human possibilities had been creatively realized in an *inimitable* way in the viable societies of primitive people. In contrast, Condorcet, Quesnay, and most of their fellow *Philosophes* were primarily in the prospective mode. (Condorcet wrote his "Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind" while in hiding from the Terror, and probably committed suicide in Robespierre's prison; he was apparently not progressive enough, having fought against the death penalty for the deposed king.) But did any major *Philosophe* ever wholly lose the dialectic sense of return which renders the future livable, and which is the hallmark of the authentic historian?

Modern anthropology, then, is the natural heir of the Enlightenment, the axial age of contemporary civilization. Our basic concern with primitives springs from the use to which Rousseau and others wished to put the Age of Discovery. Participant observation, that further refinement of field work, is rooted in the sense of history, in the effort to penetrate the consciousness of past actors, to evaluate our social being against theirs. Our progressive, evolutionary, lawful, materialistic, and secular interpretation of human development ties us to the prospective Encyclopedists. Our wrestling with the *problem* of human nature, with its variety and unity, our appreciation of cultural variation, distrust of certain values of civilization, and preoccupation with the contrasting values of primitive society place us in the retrospective tradition.

But there is one Enlightenment inheritance that we have lost: the theoretical, instrumental unity of thought and action. No Enlightenment thinker felt that he was talking into the wind. They all spun out their ideas in an experimental, dangerous, and changing environment. For better or worse, a sheltered Scholasticism was conceived as the medieval antagonist. The thinkers of the Enlightenment spoke to the ordinary citizen on the one hand (the Encyclopedia had a wide popular sale in France, proportionate, of course, to the extent of literacy), and worked as revolutionaries, ministers of state, and teachers of kings on the other. No Enlightenment thinker could have concluded with Ralph Linton (1936:490) that

> the signs are plain that this era of freedom is also drawing to a close, and there can be little doubt that the study of culture and society will be the first victim of the new order. The totalitarian State has no place for it. In fact, for men to take an interest in such matters is in itself a criticism of the existing order, an indication that they doubt its perfection. Unless all history is at fault, the social scientist will go the way of the Greek philosopher. However he also will leave a heritage of technique for investigation and *of discerned but unsolved problems;* a new frontier from which free minds will sometime press forward again into the unknown. When this time comes, perhaps after centuries of darkness and stagnation, men will look back to us as we look back to the Greeks.

Here is an anthropologist expressing his frustration at being socially and politically impotent and thus acknowledging his desire to be otherwise—to be in the Enlightenment mode. The only practical echo of the Enlightenment imperative to action is in the ambiguous milieu of applied or action anthropology, which has no force in the larger social decisions of our time, but reflects them.

As with his major Enlightenment ancestors, no contemporary anthropologist is wholly committed to the retrospective or prospective undertaking. The profession looks backward and forward at the same time, while uncomfortably straddling the breach between knowledge and action. (A breach, by the way, through which modern existentialism has made its thrust.) But there are relatively distinct types. Radin, Redfield, Sapir, and more recently, Lévi-Strauss, are significant figures in the retrospective tradition. We may take Sapir as characteristic. His distinction between genuine and spurious, that is, between authentic and inauthentic cultures readily transforms itself into a primitive-civilized historical sequence. The affective-cognitive-instrumental unity of many primitive activities serves as a basis for Sapir's critique of civilization (see, for example, his analysis of the affective isolation of the telephone operator); yet Sapir's whole approach is a plea for an understanding, and an amendment, of the modern condition.

Typical ambivalence is expressed by Redfield and Lévi-Strauss. In concluding his *The primitive World and Its Transformations*, Redfield finds it necessary to become prospective. He tries to define progress objectively, more or less following Kroeber's problematical criteria, although Kroeber had been skeptical about the subjective validity of the notion of progress as such. There is no need to examine Redfield's indices of progress, for they are not impressive (he was a brilliant retrospectivist at heart); the important thing is to note the ambivalent, and unresolved, Enlightenment inheritance.

Lévi-Strauss (1961:393 ff.), in his summary of his life thus far as an anthropologist, concludes that all human efforts can be reduced to the arrangement and rearrangement of elements forming transient structures; eventually man and his works will sink back without a trace into the flux of matter. This is as close as Lévi-Strauss gets to a prospective statement, and it is linked, if only in a rather negative fashion to the ideas of the Physiocrats, particularly those of Baron d'Holbach. However, we can understand this view logically, as well as historically, if we recall that Lévi-Strauss is a structuralist with a deep respect for primitive society, in the Rousseaean tradition. Since the primitive is beyond recall, and since he is profoundly skeptical of the possibilities of civilization, Lévi-Strauss anticipates the disintegration of human effort in the future as in the past, unless we are prepared to accept the distinguished Frenchman's deism (another Enlightenment inheritance).

Julian Steward, Leslie White, Gordon Childe, and one of their great progenitors, Tylor, are primarily prospectivists. Yet Tylor, for example, refers to the fact that "among the lessons learnt from the lives of rude tribes is how society can go on without the policeman to keep order." White, despite his special brand of mechanical materialism (which was adumbrated among the Physiocrats), assumes that a primitive level of integration is an historical reality; he has always refrained from an enthusiastic assessment of the present condition of civilization, and he has written empathically of a primitive world view. Julian Steward's evolutionism has been similarly tempered, and at one time in his career he documented the position of the clown in primitive societies, a role which implies an essential difference with civilization—the way in which socially ambiguous and personally ambivalent attitudes are structured in primitive cultures.

Most anthropologists are, however, less consciously committed to either Enlightenment tradition. Kroeber, Benedict, Boas, and Linton, among others, indicate, more randomly, both retrospective and prospective tendencies. For example, despite obvious criticisms, which need not be discussed here, it seems to me that the most striking thing about Benedict is her use of anthropology as a weapon for culturally criticizing modern civilization. Her work is a metaphorical critique of her own time—of our acquisitiveness, popular culture, and ethnic prejudices, of the position of women the inadequacy of our educational system, our misconceptions of liberty, and so on—all done with high style and verve. This variety of relativism must be seen as an attempt to educate a chaotic and narrowing society to a more spacious view of human possibilities, and for that reason alone it is likely to outline more orthodox work. Benedict came

to the study of culture with a sense of problem; but that, of course, is only the first step in the construction of faithful and significant histories.

There are other indications of the traditional ties of this middle group. Kroeber writes very sensitively of the values of folk culture, contrasting them with civilization, mentioning, in contrast, the communal values, the personalism, and the full participation of the person in folk society. Linton suggests that the decay of the local group in contemporary society, that is, of the sense and reality of community, is a fundamental problem of modern man, since it is through the local group that people learn to realize their humanity. This is a critical anthropological concept, and it is drawn from experience in the primitive locality, composed of reciprocating persons, growing from within, as opposed to the imposed, technically estranging, modern collective, whether publicly or privately organized. Boas constructs objective criteria of progress, roughly anticipating Kroeber's, but throughout his work, particularly in the area of art, one can discern an appreciation of the achievements of primitive peoples and an explicit effort to understand their varieties of aesthetic consciousness, which he believes to be more intense than is ordinarily the case in civilization. His active concern with the condition of modern civilization hardly needs documentation.

Malinowski shared that concern, and drew up a kind of model of primitive social functioning which he characterized as proto-democratic and non-exploitative in order to illuminate by contrast the nature of, and express his opposition generally to, the thoroughly politicized nation-state. Can we doubt that his "functionalism" is the reflection of that circular, institutionally integrated (but not conflict free) process that binds economic, social, and ideological aspects of behavior into single irreducible acts in primitive society? "Functionalism" is a synthetic rather than an analytic concept: it does not segregate causes and effects but deals with self-sustaining systems in which the idea of progress is irrelevant, since institutional disequilibrium is never severe enough to generate dramatic types of internal change, in part because salient conflicts are structured. Functionalism may be a sophisticated outsiders' view of the primitive system from within, a system to which Malinowski paid the highest tribute. Malinowski's initial error, if we may call it that, was in assuming that functionalism was a tool of general social analysis, rather than a theory based on human experience on a particular level of history. Later, he realized that his functionalist attitudes, which took the legitimacy and human adequacy of primitive societies for granted, could not be mechanically applied to civilized polities; that is, the latter were not necessarily good or viable merely because they seemed to function. More recently, most of the prominent British social anthropologists have indicated, in a series of published popular lectures, their respect for the institutions of primitive society and the ordinary values of primitive life.

It is clear, then, that most anthropologists somehow manage to combine both Enlightenment perspectives in their attitudes, and, to a lesser degree, in their work—even if without resolution. These teachers of ours were critics in the Enlightenment mode. But conscious efforts at synthesis, at the confrontation and transcendence of our historically derived ambivalence, are rare. Lewis Henry Morgan is almost unique in this respect. His hand in Rousseau's, he concludes *Ancient Society* as follows:

> Since the advent of civilization, the outgrowth of property has been so immense, its forms so diversified, its uses so expanding, and its management so intelligent in the interests of its owners, that it has become, on the part of the people an unmanageable power. The human mind stands bewildered in the presence of its own creation. The time will come, nevertheless, when human intelligence will rise to the mastery over property, and define the relations of the state to the property it protects, as well as the obligations and the limits of the rights of its owners. The interests of society are paramount to individual interests, and the two must be brought into just and harmonious relations. A mere property career is not the final destiny of Mankind, if progress is to be the law of the future, as it has been of the past. The time that has passed away since civilization began is but a fragment of the past duration of Man's existence, and but a fragment of the ages yet to come. The dissolution of Society bids fair to become the termination of a career of which property is the end and aim—because such a career contains the elements of self-destruction. Democracy in Government, brotherhood in society, equality in rights and privileges, and universal education foreshadow the next higher plane of society to which experience, intelligence, and knowledge are steadily tending. It will be a revival, in a higher form, of the liberty, equality, and fraternity of the ancient Gentes.

This is the most effective summary statement in Morgan's work. It derives logically from his view of the Iroquois, and from his conception of the rise of civilization traced through the early phases of the Greek and Roman states. The statement is libertarian in intent, and, interestingly enough, dialectic in form, thus sharing a common Enlightenment ancestry with the German Romantic culture historians, climaxed, albeit in a Platonic mode, by Hegel. The early Marxists, who were intellectual cousins of Morgan, and involved, if less centrally, with anthropological problems, similarly tried to resolve the Enlightenment ambivalence by prophesying a future in which the state apparatus would wither away, and in which the new technology would be wedded to the principles, not the forms, of the primitive commune, thus looking backward with Rousseau and forward with Condorcet and company. Their conceptions are, of course, in the typical Enlightenment context of intellectual action. Marx found Morgan's work congenial because each had reached complementary conclusions in working over parallel materials with commonly inherited cultural tools.

Morgan's effort to synthesize our split 18th-century inheritance was significant, but we need superior efforts. I believe it is necessary for us to develop a more precise and subtle idea, an inductive model of primitive society,[2] informed by the problems of civilization—as Morgan was concerned with the problem of property, and Malinowski with war and totalitarianism—resulting in complementary conceptions of primitive society that placed in critical perspective, critical aspects of our civilization. The search for peace is first and last the search for a viable, international, intercultural society. In seeking to speak for man, not for nation-states, and not for abstract ideological systems, anthropologists will have to assume a comprehensively critical role, based on our knowledge of and respect for what is uniquely, and necessarily, human.

References Cited

BLOCH, MARC. 1953. *The historian's craft.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

BOHANNAN, L. (Elenore Smith Bowen). 1954. *Return to laughter.* New York: Harper & Brothers.

CASAGRANDE, JOSEPH B. (ed.) 1960. *In the company of man.* New York: Harper & Brothers.

COLLINGWOOD, R. F. 1946. *The idea of history.* London: Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.

FREUCHEN, PETER. 1961. *Book of the Eskimos.* Cleveland: World Publishing Co.

KROEBER, A. L. 1948. *Anthropology: Race, language, culture, psychology, prehistory.*

LÉVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE. 1961. *World on the wane.* New York: Criterion Books.

LINTON, RALPH. 1936. *Study of man.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company.

MORGAN, LOUIS H. 1878. *Ancient society.* New York: H. Holt & Company.

[2] See, e.g., the author's "The search for the primitive," in Iago Galdston, (ed.) *Man's image in medicine and anthropology,* International Universities Press, 1963, pp. 62–115.

RASMUSSEN, KNUT. 1932. *Intellectual culture of the Copper Eskimos.* Copenhagen: Gyldendal.
REDFIELD, ROBERT. 1953. *The primitive world and its transformations.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
ROUSSEAU, JEAN JACQUES. 1949. *Discourse on the origins of inequality.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.
SAPIR, EDWARD. 1949. "Culture, genuine and spurious" in *Selected writings in languages, culture and personality.* Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
SEELEY, J. R., SIM, R. A. and E. W. LOOSLEY. 1956. *Crestwood Heights.* New York: Basic Books.
STEIN, MAURICE and ARTHUR VIDICH (Editors). 1963. *Sociology on trial.* Englewood cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
THOMAS, ELIZABETH MARSHALL. 1959. *The harmless people.* New York: Alfred Knopf.
TURNBULL, COLIN. 1961. *The forest people.* New York: Simon & Schuster.
TYLOR, EDWARD B. 1920. *Primitive culture.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
WILSON, MONICA. 1951. *Good company.* London: International African Institute by Oxford University Press.

Report on Regional Conferences

(*Continued from page 430*)

DETERRENCE STRATEGY

Comments on the strategy papers in the main repeated and expanded comments contained in the Wolfe report. The following additional points emerged:

1. It is within neither the interest nor the competence of anthropologists to choose between alternative military strategies. Their function is rather to study the "sub-culture" of the military strategists who appear to operate with a set of hypotheses and a value system not shared by the surrounding culture.

2. Games theory, the basis of most strategy thinking, is unrealistic since (a) it deals with international relations as a contest between 2 contestants, whereas the emergence of France and, potentially, of China as independent nuclear powers makes strategies based on a balance between 2 contestants unworkable; (b) it assumes that world leaders can play their game rationally and without being affected by the power structures within national states and the pull of conflicting domestic interests; and (c) it fails to define its terms; it deals with "sides" and estimates "gains" without defining what a "side" is—a territory to be defended, a population to be protected, or a way of life to be preserved—and without specifying what would be considered a "gain" in the event of nuclear war.

3. Anthropologists stand for cultural pluralism; they are against imposing the cultural ideas of any one political bloc on the rest of mankind; therefore they reject the whole concept of an "ultimate struggle."

4. "Deterrence" is a "semantic trap" which covers a variety of motives such as arms stockpiling, military empire building, etc.; that the resort to concrete technological decisions, such as testing a new weapon, masks the confusion and sense of impotence that surrounds policy making.

Some disagreement with the Wolfe report was expressed. Were the opinions in the report representative of anthropologists as a whole? Some participants maintained that, contrary to Wolfe's conclusions, anthropologists were interested in short-range problems as well as long-range research. Finally, some doubted that anthropological research could provide insights into disarmament and similar world problems, in which action is based on specific shifts in the power equilibrium. Although as citizens anthropologists might have strong feelings, on these subjects as scientists they had little to say.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH RELEVANT TO WORLD AFFAIRS

Most of the conference time was devoted to outlining anthropological research that could provide insights or useful information for problems of peace and international stability. The discussions suggested work on 3 levels: (a) basic research on the nature of war and peace and the socio-cultural processes involved in conflict and conflict resolution; (b) research on immediate problems of international and internal tension; and (c) strategies for improving communications and extending anthropological influence in world affairs.

BASIC RESEARCH IN PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND WAR

An institutional and functional analysis of war in different cultural contexts. War is not a random activity but a highly structured way of dealing with conflict. Conflict is an essential part of human relations and has its beneficial side. It is possible to study useful and destructive conflict situations, and the role of warfare as a form of social action.

Consideration of alternatives to war in the resolution of conflict. A cross-cultural study of mechanisms of conflict resolution might provide models of workable alternatives. Military authorities assume that military power is the only deterrent, but is this the reason that there has been no war? A study of places in the world where deterrence strategies have been stable for a long time might provide useful insights into the present situation.

A study of the "culture" of nuclear war. Do we understand the assumptions with which policy makers operate? Most anthropologists accept without question such postulates as the unity of the human race and racial equality, and the fact that all social behavior is learned and can be unlearned or altered. This does not seem to be part of the cognitive structure of military strategists. The military establishment, with its ramifying structure, its mythology, symbols, ideology, and systems of action, like any other sub-culture, is an appropriate object of anthropological study. While anthropologists cannot enter the Pentagon as "participant observers" of its culture, the anthropological tools used to study culture at a distance—content analysis, semantic analysis, and analysis of negotiating behavior, for example—might be applied.

The dynamics of complex societies. One of the postulates of anthropology is that systematic relationships exist between and among the various aspects of culture. It was suggested that 1 function of arms stockpiling is to maintain international tensions at a high level, thereby increasing anxiety and, consequently, the control of the state over its population. Covert aspects of our culture, including our goals in exporting our technology and our political and social value systems, need to be explored by the methods of social science.

The nature of ideologies and ideological commitments. How are ideologies formed at the centers of power; how are they disseminated; and what are the nature and degree of commitment of the general public to them? The indifference of large sections of the American public to the official position on the Cuban crisis and shelter programs suggested this area of investigation. What anthropologists know about the contexts of learning would be relevant.

The study of social change with attention to the conditions under which social integration takes place. Relevant areas of study would be the development of confederacies and nation states in the past; current situations of culture contact; and the readjustments and new syntheses involved in the integration of units and the abolition of war between social components.